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DRAFT. FINAL VERSION TO APPEAR IN THE JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY. 
 
 In spite of being ubiquitous in life sciences, the concept of information is harshly criticized. 
Uses of the concept other than those derived from Shannon's theory are denounced as 
pernicious metaphors. We perform a computational experiment to explore whether Shannon's 
information is adequate to describe the uses of said concept in commonplace scientific practice. 
Our results show that semantic sequences do not have unique complexity values different from 
the value of meaningless sequences. This result suggests that quantitative theoretical 
frameworks do not account fully for the complex phenomenon that the term “information” 
refers to. We propose a restructuring of the concept into two related, but independent notions, 
and conclude that a complete theory of biological information must account completely not only 
for both notions, but also for the relationship between them. 
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The concept of information has a central role in contemporary biology. For example, information is at 
the core of molecular biology, one of the most important theoretic structures to emerge in the 20th 
century life sciences, and the one that currently informs our way of understanding the process of life.  
Despite its central role in contemporary biology, the notion of information remains controversial. Some 
scientists and philosophers believe that the only legitimate use of the notion of information in biology 
is that coming from quantitative approaches such as Shannon's information theory (Shannon, 1948; 
Weaver and Shannon, 1963) or Kolmogorov-Chaitin's complexity (Kolmogorov, 1965; Chaitin, 1969).  
In the view of these authors, all other uses of information are metaphoric, terms without a proper 
referent, and even detrimental to the proper understanding of biological systems (i.e., Sarkar, 2001; 
Griffiths, 2001; Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny, 2008; Moss, 2003).   
 
In the present paper, we argue that informational terms are far from metaphoric but the conceptual 
structure that underlies them does need clarification. In general, we believe that minimally, a theory of 
biological information should explain how certain data are used to transmit a message. In our opinion, 
most popular accounts on information have paid a lot of attention on data (i.e. on their attributes, on 
how they are encoded and transmitted), and little on how such data becomes meaningful information. 
 
To defend our point, we designed an experiment to determine whether quantitative approaches can 
account for the broad, albeit fuzzy understanding of the concept of information. In our experiment, we 
measure information as understood in Shannon’s information theory, where “measuring information” 
amounts to calculating the complexity of a given structure, meaning the minimum amount of 
information that would be required to reconstruct completely the original structure, in this case, a given 
DNA sequence. Our results show that functional biological sequences have high complexity but, more 
importantly, it shows that there are alternative, meaningless sequences with similar complexity 
measures. This means that no particular value of algorithmic complexity is inherently bound to 
meaningful content and in consequence, quantitative accounts on information can explain a part, but 
not everything we want to convey when talking about biological information in terms of coding, 
transmission and content. Our results give support to those authors who believe that such quantitative 
approaches should be complemented with semantic theories. 
  
From the results of our experiment, we argue that there are at least two notions of biological 
information: the first involves a notion where information is generally understood as a set of attributes 
pertaining to an object, typically the genetic sequence, which can be analyzed by means of information 
theory. The second notion deals with the ways in which certain attributes acquire meaning. We have 
called these kinds object-information and process-information, respectively. We suggest that the 
controversy surrounding the notion of information is in part the result of conflating two related but 
independent notions of information. We believe that our distinction provides a basis for the 
construction of a theory of biological information that can be used to better understand the problems 
and possible solutions to current controversies of information. 
 
We proceed as follows: in section II, we present the computational experiment; in section III, we 
discuss our results, placing them in context of other authors and proposing a separation of the concept 
of information into two notions, pointing out possible ways to articulate them; and we offer brief 
concluding remarks and possible directions for further inquiry in section IV. 
 
2. A computational experiment 
 
2.1 Aims of the experiment 
Our experiment aims to answer the following question: what is the relationship between the values 
obtained when measuring genetic sequences using quantitative approaches, and what we usually want 
to convey in biological discourse when talking of information? To keep the discussion as simple as 
possible, in this experiment information is limited to the processes of transcription and translation, that 
is, to the whole process that goes from “reading” the genetic sequence to synthesizing a given protein.  
Even though information permeates an enormous diversity of biological processes at different levels of 
description, the so-called genetic information serves our purpose well for a host of reasons: it stands at 
the center of the information controversy, data is readily available and the mechanisms of gene 
expression have been thoroughly researched. Furthermore, any biological information theory should 
explain how a code is transmitted and transformed into meaningful data (or at least, how to tell what's 
meaningful from what is not). 
 
 The basic premise of our experiment is: if information were a univocal notion, quantifiable and 
dependent on the structure of the sequence, it could be represented wholly in internal structural 
measures, such as Shannon's entropy or complexity. Under this scenario, structural measures would 
function as a kind of diagnosis to predict semantic content and nothing else would be needed. However, 
if semantic content and structural measures were different in any way – that is, if the complexity 
features of a sequence were independent of semantics – it would mean that there are aspects of the 
notion of information that are not touched upon by sequence-structure analysis. It would not mean that 
information-theoretic approaches are incorrect, but that they are incomplete. 
 
2.2 Methods 
 
In our experiment we use the total translatable DNA sequences of four organisms. The organisms 
chosen were Nanoarchaeum equitans (Waters et al, 2003), Mycoplasma genitalium (Fraser et al, 1995), 
Schizosaccharomyces pombe (Wood et al., 2002), and the Mimivirus from Entamoeaba (Raoult et al, 
2004). The first three model organisms were chosen as representative of the three separate domains of 
life (Archaea, Eubacteria and Eukarya, respectively), to encompass phylogenetically distant organisms. 
The inclusion of Mimivirus, a complex and large virus that infects amoebas, presented a decision point 
for us. Viruses have long been problematic in terms of classification and under some definitions of life 
may even be considered to be non-living, but we decided to include them to further increase the 
diversity of the analysis. 
 
We used the complementary DNA (cDNA) of all four organisms selected and obtained their proteome. 
We then measured the information content of all four proteomes (see figure 1). As a method of 
measuring the information of each proteome we turned to string compression, a common method used 
to estimate the value of algorithmic complexity. Briefly, the general idea is to calculate the minimum 
algorithm that would be necessary to reconstruct a given sequence. If the sequence is random, then the 
amount of information necessary to reconstruct the sequence is the same as the sequence itself as there 
would be no way of telling what symbol comes next. This is called maximum complexity, or maximum 
value. However, if the sequence is not random, then it is possible to obtain an algorithm that has less 
information than the original sequence (and hence is “compressed” in relation to the original source), 
because there would be a way of calculating, probabilistically, what symbol comes next in the sequence 
(for a review see Li and Vitányi, 2008). 
  
In this paper we used the algorithm described in Cao et al. (2007), as it was especially developed to 
deal with biological sequences, both nucleic and peptidic. The measurements yielded, expressed in bits 
per symbol (bps), indicate more complexity as they approach the maximum value. The maximum value 
is calculated by the formula Vmax = log2A, where A is the number of  symbols in the alphabet. Thus, 
for nucleic acids, which can be constituted by 4 different bases, Vmax = log2(4) = 2, and for amino 
acid chains, formed by 20 different possible amino acids, Vmax = log2(20) = 4.322. 
 
 
Figure 1. The experiment. We obtained the proteome (the entire set of proteins expressed by the 
genome) of four different organisms using their cDNA (1). Then, we produced a set of artificial 
proteomes for each organism by assigning to each naturally occurring codon a random amino acid 
(figure 2a illustrates the natural code and figure 2b the artificial assignment). Finally, we measured the 
information content of all proteomes, both natural (vertical line) and artificial (histogram), using string 
compression (3). 
 
 
Once the calculations were performed, we asked ourselves whether the values obtained were enough to 
account for our minimal understanding of information, that is, if the values obtained were enough to 
account for meaningful data in the context of the organisms under study. To answer this question, we 
produced a set of 1000 artificial genetic codes by randomly assigning a specific amino acid to each 
DNA codon from each of our four organisms. After that, we used each of the artificial genetic codes to 
produce artificial proteomes (Figure 1 central panel). Note that in this experimental set-up, artificial 
genetic codes are meaningless in the context of the organisms under study because in nature codons 
code univocally for specific amino acids. For this reason, we will say that natural genomes carry 
meaningful information whereas artificial genomes do not and the question will be to know if 
complexity measures can tell apart the difference. 
 
2.3 Results 
 
Figure 2 shows the results of the experiment for each of the four organism (figures 2A to 2D). Bars 
represent the distribution of the values of algorithmic complexity for 1000 alternative proteomes 
produced with artificial genetic codes, and the vertical line shows the value for the proteomes produced 
by the standard genetic code. 
  
Figure 2. Comparison between the compression ratio of the standard proteomes (vertical line) and the 
distribution of the alternative proteomes derived from the genomes of a) Entamoeba histolytica 
mimivirus; b) Nanoarchaeum equitans; c) Mycoplasma genitalium; and d) Saccharomyces pombe. 
Histograms illustrate compression values for 1000 artificial proteomes and the single vertical line 
shows compression values obtained for the naturally-occurring proteomes for each organism under 
study. Note that even though the standard proteomes have an unusually high informational complexity, 
they are not unique, as we obtained alternative codes with similar complexity measures. See text for 
further details. 
 
 
The measurements for the standard proteomes are very high in all four graphs, approaching the 
maximum complexity value, which means that, structure-wise, biological sequences with semantic 
content are not easily compressed and approach complete randomness. For example, the standard 
genome compression value of E. hystolytica mimivirus deviates 1.1430 standard deviations (σ) from 
the mean value of the artificial proteomes distribution, which means that it is higher than 87.35% of the 
proteomes analyzed (see Table 1). Values for artificial genomes were distributed along a wide array of 
values. However, the important result is that we obtained a subset of artificial proteomes with similar 
complexity values to those obtained for standard codes (Figure 2). 
 
Table 1. Statistical comparison between the standard genetic code and the mean of the artificially 
generated proteomes. Columns 1 and 2 compare the mean compression values of the alternative 
proteomes we constructed and the compression value of the actual, standard proteome respectively. 
Columns 3-5 summarize a statistical analysis of the difference of the values in 1 and 2. 
 
 
The codes that yielded the compression values most similar to that of the standard code were 
completely different, meaning that few (if any) of the translation rules were coincident with the 
standard ones (figure 3). That is, the codons were assigned to different amino acids in almost all of the 
alternative codes. In actual biological systems, the change in the assignment of a single codon brings 
catastrophic consequences in the functionality of the translated proteins. We did not constrain the 
assignments of codons to families of redundancy, further increasing the difference of each alternative 
proteome with the original. It is thus safe to assume that the alternative proteomes possess no 
functional information in the context of the original organism, even if they are derived from the same 
cDNA genome. 
  
Our experimental results show that no particular value of algorithmic complexity is inherently bound to 
meaningful content. Meaningful content is intuitively associated to a high level of complexity because 
it is very unlikely that a periodically repetitive sequence can carry a meaningful message and the 
syntactic cues necessary to interpret it. In addition, the complexity of a semantic sequence can't be 
maximal, because maximal complexity would entail that the sequence is random and, once again, 
meaning and syntax would be impossible without an internal structure of some kind. As remarked by 
Abel and Trevors (2005), it is likely that most sequences containing some sort of semantic information 
will be located in a subset of high, but not maximum complexity. We partially agree with their 
suggestion, but we show that semantic sequences have no unique complexity value, different from the 
value of meaningless sequences. We show that there are meaningless sequences that have compression 
values remarkably similar to the standard proteome. In other words, it is impossible to diagnose the 
presence of semantic information from the value of a measure that refers to sequence structure, though 
it is possible to predict that the structure of semantic sequences will have high complexity. 
 
 
Figure 3. Comparison between two possible “genetic codes”. Briefly, the genetic code is constructed 
by the combination of the four nucleotides Uracyl, Cysteine, Adenine and Guanine shown in the table 
with the letters U, C, A and G respectively. Combination formed by three nucleotides are called codons, 
and particular codons code for the 20 aminoacids plus three STOP codons. In the figure, Code a) is the 
standard genetic code; Code b) is an alternative code, which was constructed artificially by randomly 
reassigning aminoacids to naturally-occurring codons, and differs from code a) in its general structure 
and the great majority of individual assignments. In spite of their different origins and structures, the 
translations effected by the artificial code were consistently similar to those of the standard genetic 
code in terms of informational complexity. See text for further details. 
 
 
3. Discussion 
3.1 The quantitative notion of information 
 
Our computational experiment stresses different manifestations of information that are not reducible to 
one another. We propose that quantitative conceptualizations of information, centered on the 
description and analysis of the structure of a given sequence, be called “object-information”, whereas 
the second kind to be explained in section 3.2, be called “process-information”. 
 
 Object-information is associated to a given sequence, and the sequence is an object with defined, 
quantifiable characteristics such as Shannon's entropy (Shannon, 1948). These quantifiable 
characteristics are exclusively derived from the internal structure of the object. Under the scope of 
Information Theory, each element of a sequence has a frequency which can be interpreted as the 
probability of its appearance. The information entropy (H) of a sequence is expressed in the formula 
 
     
 
where P(i) stands for the frequency of each symbol i. The value of H ranges from 0 to 1; the greater the 
value, the more information a sequence contains. In the context of Shannon's theory, information is not 
meant to be semantic or functional. A higher content of information means that each symbol has a 
similar frequency; thus, a maximum informational entropy value means that the next symbol emitted 
by the source is completely unpredictable. 
 
The limitations of information theory, of which Shannon himself was well aware, emerge when we 
consider other kinds of internal order. For example, a sequence can have maximum informational 
entropy and still be highly structured. Imagine, for example, a sequence that consists only of the 
symbol 0 repeated a hundred times, followed by the symbol 1 repeated another hundred times. This 
sequence is far from random but it is maximally entropic. Informational entropy only tallies the 
appearance of each symbol and yields a probability distribution for the next; as our imaginary sequence 
has exactly the same number of each of two possible symbols, the probability for the next symbol 
produced by the source is 0.5 (zero or one). In other words, the next symbol is completely uncertain 
and our sequence is unpredictable. This means that a sequence can be unbiased, have maximum 
informational entropy and a clear internal structure – it can even be a periodic repetition of signs, which 
obviously is far from complex. To solve this problem, Kolmogorov (1965), Solomonoff (1960) and 
Chaitin (1969) proposed independently the concept of algorithmic complexity:  a sequence of length n 
is maximally complex if it needs an algorithm of length ≥ n  to be specified, and this in turn means that 
the sequence is random as it has no discernible patterns to exploit. Without any sort of pattern, the 
algorithm or computer program to produce such sequence as output would necessarily be a program 
that specifies, symbol by symbol, the whole sequence.  
 
More recently, other authors have attempted to circumvent the shortcomings of object-information. For 
example, Hazen et al. (2007) propose a measure of “functional information”. In general terms, a 
 sequence of signs has higher functional information if it raises the probability of bringing about some 
predetermined outcome. For example, the authors state that the sequence MAPLENMAIN has higher 
functional information than DANGERFIRE as it is more likely to summon the fire department to a 
particular address (the corner of Maple and Main streets). This work is particularly relevant as the 
authors explicitly try to deal with biological information as one of the uses of their quantification. 
However, once again the intention is to make meaning a characteristic internal to the sequence by 
introducing the assumption that systems remain fixed (its behavior and structure is always the same), 
and that somehow, there are universal cues that not only carry information but also help the system 
decide what is meaningful from what is not. Hazen et.al. call such cues prescriptive information. For 
example, in the sequence MAPLENMAIN the middle N must be universally understood as being short 
for AND and that whenever we say Maple and Main we all mean the corner formed by the streets 
Maple and Main. Note that these cues also help decide that DANGERFIRE is uninformative even if the 
system understands that such string of symbols tells of a fire happening somewhere. Note that Hazen 
et.al’s analysis makes sense only in the context of a fire department. In any other context (say, a civilian 
that happens to tune in the frequency transmitting the message, or a passerby that stumbles upon a 
piece of paper with the message written on it) “DANGERFIRE” would certainly be more informative 
as it would bring to mind the catastrophe, while “MAPLENMAIN” would sound at most like a cryptic 
reference to an intersection. Hazen et al., however, argue that functional information can be measured 
regardless of the receiver, the context, etc. While they do not make this assertion explicitly (the 
example is well constrained inside the narrative of a fire department), as long as they try to measure 
information referring only to the sequence, they make information an attribute of the sequence itself. 
Thus, they are conflating an object (the sequence) with a process (with in this case includes but is not 
limited to the context of transmission). 
 
The attempt to quantify prescriptive information relies on constructing a theory that ignores an 
indeterminate number of contextual events: in the example above, relaying the information to a fire 
department, the competence of firefighters in deciphering a mangled telegraphic message or their 
proficiency in the English language to name a few. Because of these problems, functional information 
faces a dilemma: either the measure is relative (which defeats the purpose of the theory) or the theory is 
riddled with a series of philosophical problems such as intentionality, determinism, mentalism or 
teleology. 
 
 Neither algorithmic complexity nor quantifications like Hazen et al.'s are absolute measurements like 
Shannon's. They are not computable and in any case, they can only approximate to a concrete value, as 
it is dependent on the method for determining it, but unlike informational entropy, they have other 
virtues. Algorithmic complexity has the advantage of exploring certain structural features of a sequence, 
and functional information tries to account for the response to a sequence. In any case, quantitative-
centered analyses have in common the presupposition that information resides completely in the 
structural features of a sequence. Our experimental results show that biological information is not only 
a function of the structure of a sequence, so another theoretical framework is needed.   
 
3.2 Expanding the notion of information 
 
Both Shannon's and Kolmogorov's measures are just one aspect of information. They refer exclusively 
to a string of symbols, even though the string itself can be thought of as the result of a process – a 
continuous emission of signs in the case of Shannon, or a repetition of a specific sequence executed by 
a computer program in the case of Kolmogorov. The measures can be evaluated in the sequence itself, 
and no consideration of its context or its temporal changes is needed. Thus, the meaning of information 
is lost in the quantitative analyses. To deal with this shortcoming, we propose another kind of 
information which will need a new theoretical approach, and which we will name “process-
information”1. 
 
Process information depends on an interpretative activity. This interpretation is the event that makes 
any given sequence meaningful. It can be immediately noted that process information deals with that 
facet of information that is sometimes deemed metaphoric by certain authors (Sarkar, 2001; Griffiths, 
2001; Kay, 2000), as it can be extremely variable in its nature and results. Process information doesn't 
refer exclusively to genetic information: a meaningful message can be actualized through DNA and 
amino acid chains, but also through cellular receptors and external molecules or the sensorial data used 
by an organism to construct a representation of its surroundings, among many other examples. What 
matters is the relationship between the elements, and the dynamic change in the system caused by 
interpretation. In this respect, this notion of information is close to Gregory Bateson's (2000) 
formulation of information as “a difference that makes a difference”. 
                                                 
1
 Both the division of the two notions of information and the description of the different domains they refer to were inspired 
by Anthony Eagle's excellent treatment of product- and process- randomness. See Eagle, 2014. 
 
  
The complete separation of what we call object- and process-information can seem difficult, given that 
object-information can serve as a sort of raw material for informational processes. For example, a 
stretch of DNA (an object-information) can instruct the synthesis of a specific protein, via the 
conventional relationships between codons and amino acids that constitute the genetic code (process 
information). However, it should be kept in mind that the distinction between object-information and 
process-information resides at different levels of description. The concept of object-information is 
concerned with internal relationships; in the case of DNA, the ratio of each nucleotide, the possible 
patterns in which they appear and so on. Process information deals with external relationships; that is, 
the possible semiotic relations that can arise between nucleic acids and their amino acid translations via 
an interpretant element that cannot be part of the sequence. But what can this interpretant element be? 
In sections 3.3 and 3.4 we explore this issue by discussing previous attempts to understand biological 
information. However, it is important to say at this point that we are a long way from understanding 
what this interpretant element may be. Our experiment gives empirical support to an intuition held by 
many experts in the field that quantitative measure are not enough to account for physiological 
processes related for example, to genetics or epigenetics, fields where a clear understanding of 
information is crucial. For this reason, we believe that a clear conceptual separation of the two notions 
of information presented here can dispel the frequent misgivings about the appropriateness of the 
terminology. Thus, we strive to distance the concepts of information from the information-as-blueprint 
view and the determinism it entails. We also try to show that information, understood as two separate 
notions, does not entail a special kind of causation that is context-independent. Rather the opposite: 
contextualization, along with the physicochemical characteristics of the system in which information 
arises, are necessary to understand biological processes.   
 
3.3 Comparison to other approaches to information 
 
It is undeniable that many of the terms in molecular biology derive from the contingent synchronic rise 
of the DNA sciences, information technology and cybernetics; but it is not our goal to analyze the 
social or historical context of the scientific community and its linguistic conventions. Our discussion is 
closer to everyday scientific practice, as we try to evaluate the validity of the concept of biological 
information by stressing a separation between different theoretical frameworks. Commonplace 
scientific discourse usually makes no distinction between a sequence of DNA (object-information) and 
the meaningful information it supposedly carries (process-information). It is true that most of the time, 
 this can be considered a conceptual shorthand: “a gene for a trait”, be it anatomical, physiological or 
developmental. The shorthand might be even more precise in some cases, as the gene will be associated 
only with a specific post-editing mRNA molecule and the corresponding amino acid chain. We must be 
quite insistent that this is not the issue at hand; we are not discussing the nature of the concept “gene”, 
nor we are interested in localizing an arbitrary point in time in which the “informational molecule” 
expresses its message. The central issue of this paper is the same one that worries some authors like 
Lewontin (1983), Oyama (2000) or Sarkar (2001): that genetic information is conceptualized as an 
entity containing the instructions that will cause some trait to emerge, as if it were a scripted program 
interpretable in only one way. This attitude towards information can hardly be blamed. Minuscule 
changes in a sequence are readily associated with specific and often disastrous changes in a trait. These 
effects are in some cases so predictable that they are powerful tools for research in molecular biology.  
 
Our approach to information differs from certain attempts to understand it systematically. For example, 
the framework we propose is not compatible with Floridi's treatment of information. Floridi (2005) 
supports an extended DOS (“declarative, objective and semantic”) definition of information, in which 
the communication is considered semantic if and only if it consists of data, is well-formed, meaningful 
and truthful. We have no place for truth-value in this account of semantics, as any concept of a “true” 
communication would assume the possibility of a correspondence between object-information and a 
state of the world prior the occurrence of the process. This assumption takes for granted, then, that 
some kind of symbolic information is inherently encoded in the DNA and it will either speak about the 
world (if it is not misinforming) or it will indicate a precise sequence of states that will take place 
within the living being. Neither of those presuppositions are considered in our informational account. 
In our account, meaning cannot be characterized as being “true” or “false; meaning can be evaluated 
only in terms of the changes in the dynamics of the system.  Our distinction is similar to Sterelny and 
Griffiths' (1999) causal and intentional separation; indeed, they speak about an “aboutness” that can be 
misinterpreted as a trademark of intentional information. However, they completely reject an 
intentional element in biological systems. In fact, they place a divide between information derived from 
physical causation and an utterance with no necessary connection with a factual state of the world. The 
present paper argues that this intentional information can and must be included in a complete 
description of a biological system. This is done by carefully avoiding any attribution of process-
information as a characteristic of an object. With this conceptual shift, we can escape the otherwise 
inevitable pitfall of affirming that every possible informational phenomenon is contained, previous to 
 the process of interpretation, in the informational sequence (as would seem necessary for accounts such 
as Hazen et al.). 
 
The proposed division is closer, in any case, to Bergstrom and Rosvall (2009). Trying to keep 
Shannon’s framework but still being true to what biologist understand when they talk of information, 
Bergstrom and Rosvall propose the “transmission sense of information”, where “[A]n object X conveys 
information if the function of X is to reduce, by virtue of its sequence properties, uncertainty on the 
part of an agent who observes X (Bersgstrom and Rosvall 2009, p.165).” In their proposal, the marriage 
between Shannon and a decision-theoretic approach conveyed through the explicit introduction of an 
agent is meant to incorporate the notion that information is not simply a correlation between variables 
(Godfrey-Smith 2007), but a message transmitted to someone for something, in this case, from parents 
to offspring to help them make a living. While the intuition is certainly correct, Bergstrom and Rosvall 
still try to pack the two general notions of information (to be fair, only genetic information) into one 
general framework but, as we show, Shannon or Kolmogorov can deal with some, but not with all the 
information conveyed in the genetic sequence and therefore, seems better to us to use two different 
notions to better clarify the phenomena. 
 
3.4 Bridging the two notions 
 
The separation of concepts proposed throughout this paper is a necessary clarification. It contributes to 
understanding the information terminology that has been denounced on various grounds, from the 
inception of several genetic terms taken from the communication sciences, to the preformationist 
misconceptions about the dominance of genes as the principal source of order in the processes of life – 
and particularly in development. Firstly, the separation helps to rule out the preformationistic ideas: if a 
sequence, which fits the object-information theoretical framework, is treated like process-information, 
it is automatically endowed with more attributes than it can possibly have. We can extract useful data 
from the sequences, such as informational entropy or algorithmic complexity; but this kind of 
quantitative analyses will never reveal the network of relationships that an information-carrying object 
has in a biological system. This is precisely the usefulness of process-information: it treats information 
as this network of relationships, which eventually elicit changes in the dynamics of the system. A 
particularly striking example comes from one of our model organisms, the Entamoeba Mimivirus. For 
all their recently found complexity (Raoult and Forterre, 2008), viruses still depend on the 
interpretation of information by their host organisms. In this case, the Entamoeba molecular 
 mechanism is able to interpret DNA that is foreign to it; if it were not for this interpretative possibility, 
the viral cycle would be interrupted inescapably.  The freedom that our process-information notion 
imparts upon interpretation makes it easy to describe and explain the informational interaction that 
occurs between seemingly distinct organisms, because our notion permits a point of view in which 
context and temporality are not only important, but necessary to understand the informational event. In 
the case of the Mimivirus for example, the host cell becomes an integral part of explaining and 
describing information as a process. 
 
In addition, the separation is the groundwork on which a coherent theory of biological information can 
be built. The concept of information seems simple enough, but defies the efforts to construct a univocal 
definition. As Floridi (2004) points out, it is inherently polisemic and on par with the most 
philosophically complex terms such as “truth” or “being”. In this paper we do not defend the idea of 
information as a physical object, comparable to matter and energy, as Battail (2009, 2012) (maybe 
metaphorically) suggests. In our account, information is not some thing, but rather some relationship. 
Both process- and object-information are powerful concepts because of the richness and diversity of the 
situations and objects that fit the network of relations they posit. Moreover, a complete theory of 
informational relations is useful, at least heuristically, as it would treat its objects of enquiry as part of a 
symbolic system. This would permit an analysis of certain characteristic traits of symbols, such as 
arbitrariness, which can't be captured by a mechanistic causal explanation; it would not only justify the 
commonplace use of informational terms, but it would give a way to relate diverse elements of 
biological systems that is not restricted to mere physicochemical causation. Trevors and Abel (2004) 
make a similar point when discussing the origins of biological information systems, saying that the 
dichotomic view of life as the product of either chance or necessity is insufficient to account for the 
emergence of the genetic coding system. In any case, these discussions mean that information 
terminology would rely on a set of theories that are complementary, rather than antagonistic, to other 
approaches.  
 
For example, the separation we try to clarify echoes the duality found in von Neumann's (1966), H. H. 
Pattee's (1995) and L. M. Rocha's (1997) accounts on the symbol-matter problem, which points to the 
possibility of expanding the divide proposed in this work to a broader scope. A radical point of 
departure from these authors is that they assume that a purely physicalist explanation is sufficient to 
account for the symbolic mode of behavior. Pattee, for example, places a divide between physical laws 
and boundary conditions which ultimately is localized as a sort of artifact derived from the presence of 
 an observer (his famous concept of “epistemic cut”). We consider Rocha to be closer to the views we 
propose, but ultimately, he too resolves the difference between matter and symbols with mechanistic 
presuppositions: “material symbol systems... must be formed out of certain available material parts” 
(section 2.2 in Rocha 1997), and thus are limited to a finite, predefined set of configurations. Rocha 
and Pattee's efforts are to parallel ours, as their starting point is also the realization of some elements of 
the description that are not accounted for by the usual theoretical framework. They both try to include 
some sort of contextual cues from the environment to make sense of the notion of information 
processing in biological systems. However, in the end they still restrict their analyses to a combinatorial 
logic and remain within a mechanistic view of information. 
 
There have been some theoretical proposals that aim to deal with what we call process-information in a 
way that tries to account for their open-endedness, such as the innovative views of biosemiotics (see 
El-Hani et al, 2006; Favareau, 2008; Abel 2009; Barbieri, 2013). This relatively recent field centers 
fundamental analyses on the relationship between of three elements: an object, a signifying element 
and an interpretant. This triad of elements was proposed by the semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1955) as a way to answer a fundamental question that riddles us too: how can it be that symbols have 
an effect on the world, but are not describable by physical laws? His answer, which we find appealing, 
was to propose a more basic idea, his general, triadic, “short list” of categories. In a semiotic system, 
the sign is recognized as meaning something (i.e., the object), and elicits a change (i.e., the interpretant) 
in some aspect of the system. Note that the interpretant is not meant to be a little genie hiding 
somewhere in our cells, but a process that elicits a change. For example, Arnellos et al (2012) provides 
a physiological example: an antigen (the sign) refers to an object external to the cell such as a pathogen 
and elicits an immune response that is the interpretant. The semiotic relationship is said to be 
dynamical, because the identities are not fixed upon the different parts of the semiotic process; for 
example, a sign produced by an interpretative action of a semiotic system can act as an interpretant in a 
further triad, and so on. Thus, the semiotic phenomenon forms a web of sign relations, and the overall 
effect of this web is a structured change of dynamics of the system, when the system is confronted by 
different signs. In the example provided by Arnellos et.al, think of allergies: for as much as we know 
about the immune response, we are still a long way from grasping how is it possible that all of a sudden, 
your daily aspirin triggers anaphylaxis. In this case, the sign comes to mean something that the 
interpretant (a set of elements (objects and their interactions) belonging to the immune system) takes to 
be one thing when it used to mean something else. This contextual sensitivity and the focus on 
 temporal development of the semiotic process are what we want to convey with our description of 
process-information. 
 
4. Concluding remarks. 
 
Throughout this paper we have argued for a clear separation of different informational domains as a 
means to preserve part of the theoretical framework of information, and to address some of the valid 
criticisms made by various authors. There are still many unanswered questions regarding the role of 
information in living beings. For example, and most clearly, we lack a structuring account of process-
information that helps us understand the complex interwoven net of interpretation. There have been 
many efforts to construct a viable formalization drawing from Shannon's theory (for a classical 
example, Bar-Hillel and Carnap, 1953), but these theories of semantic content make idealizations that 
render them unfit for our purposes. Particularly, they try to pinpoint semantic content as a property of 
object-information, and we have insisted that we need a semantic theory that deals with dynamic 
relationships of the different elements as a process. 
 
As necessary the separation may be, the next step for developing a complete theory of information 
must be bridging the two notions. We have tried to point to the direction of this bridging, which in our 
view will take the form of a theory of information which can't be reduced to a quantitative framework. 
The consequences of this theoretical irreducibility reach far and deep, as many metaphysical 
commitments that are taken for granted must be reassessed.  With this paper, our goal has been to 
contribute to the discussion of bioinformation by providing tangible evidence in the form of a computer 
experiment. Our results show how the concept of information in biology needs to be restructured and 
we propose it can be done by considering two sides of information in terms of objects and processes.  
The present paper has endeavored to present both sides, object- and process-information, as 
complementary. However, the manifestations of information that are not accounted for by Shannon's 
theory (or other similar quantitative frameworks) are generally considered metaphorical and, 
consequently, not integrated in as a solution for the criticisms of informational terminology. As our two 
notions of information are independent but clearly related, the separation and subsequent articulation 
we propose can serve as the common ground that is needed to build a general, more satisfactory theory 
of biological information.  
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 (1) Mean 
compression of the 
alternative 
proteomes (bps) 
(2) Standard genetic 
code proteome 
compression (bps) 
σ value of 
(1) 
Right tail P-value 
A.polyphag
a mimivirus 
3.83 4.0410 0.2135 0.1265 
M.genitaliu
m 
3.7742 4.0999 0.1801 0.0692 
N.equitans 3.8377 4.0735 0.2131 0.1093 
S.pombe 3.9440 4.1651 0.1112 0.0234 
 
Table 1. Statistical comparison between the standard genetic code and the mean of the artificially 
generated proteomes. Columns 1 and 2 compare the mean compression values of the alternative 
proteomes we constructed and the compression value of the actual, standard proteome respectively. 
Columns 3-5 summarize a statistical analysis of the difference of the values in 1 and 2. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The experiment. We obtained the proteome (the entire set of proteins expressed by the 
genome) of four different organisms using their cDNA (1). Then, we produced a set of artificial 
proteomes for each organism by assigning to each naturally occurring codon a random amino acid 
(figure 2a illustrates the natural code and figure 2b the artificial assignment). Finally, we measured the 
information content of all proteomes, both natural (vertical line) and artificial (histogram), using string 
compression (3). 
  
 
Figure 2. Comparison between the compression ratio of the standard proteomes (vertical line) and the 
distribution of the alternative proteomes derived from the genomes of a) Entamoeba histolytica 
mimivirus; b) Nanoarchaeum equitans; c) Mycoplasma genitalium; and d) Saccharomyces pombe. 
Histograms illustrate compression values for 1000 artificial proteomes and the single vertical line 
shows compression values obtained for the naturally-occurring proteomes for each organism under 
study. Note that even though the standard proteomes have an unusually high informational complexity, 
they are not unique, as we obtained alternative codes with similar complexity measures. See text for 
further details. 
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 U C A G  
U UUU     F 
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A 
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Fig. 3. Comparison between two possible genetic codes. Briefly, the genetic code is constructed by the 
combination of four nucleotides Uracyl, Cysteine, Adenine and Guanine shown in the table with the 
letters U, C, A and G respectively. Combinations formed by three nucleotides are called codons, and 
particular codons code for the 20 aminoacids (single capital letters) plus three STOP codons. In the 
 figure, Code a) is the standard genetic code; Code b) is an alternative code constructed artificially by 
randomly reassigning aminoacids to naturally-occurring codons, and differs from code a) in its general 
structure and the great majority of individual assignments. In spite of their different origins and 
structures, the translations effected by the artificial code were consistently similar to those of the 
standard genetic code in terms of informational complexity. See text for further details. 
 
